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Abstract
The main goal of the paper is to shed light on economic allocations issues, in particu-
lar by focusing on individuals who receive nothing (that is an amount of zero allocation
or payoff). It is worth noting that such individuals may be considered, in some contexts,
as poor or socially excluded. To this end, our study relies on the notion of cooperative
games with transferable utility and the Linear Efficient and Symmetric values (called
LES values) are considered as allocation rules. Null players in Shapley sense are ex-
tensively studied ; two broader classes of null players are introduced. The analysis is
facilitated by the help of a parametric representation of LES values. It is clearly shown
that the control of what a LES value assigns as payoffs to null players gives significant
information about the characterization of the value. Several axiomatic characterizations
of subclasses of LES values are provided using our approach.
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1 Introduction
One of the main issues in the theory of economic allocation consists in pointing
out the group of individuals who receive nothing (zero as allocation or payoff). Such
individuals, in some contexts, are considered to be poor or socially excluded. Further-
more, discussion about the identification of these classes of individuals may bring out
significant properties of the allocation rule used. Therefore any attempt to analyze and
understand the way such a situation arises is an interesting subject about social consi-
derations. In this regard, cooperative games provide useful tools.
The present article deals with cooperative games with transferable utility. A transferable
utility game (or cooperative game or coalitional game with side pay-ments or simply a
TU-game) is a pair (N, v), where N is a finite set of at least two elements and v : 2N → R
is a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0. An element of N and a nonempty subset
S of N are called a player and a coalition, respectively, and the real number v(S) is
called the worth of coalition S.
The solution part of cooperative game theory deals with the allocation problem of
how to share the overall earnings the amount of v(N) among the players who par-
ticipate in the TU-game. There is associated a single allocation rule called the value
of the TU-game. A value on Γ(N) is a function ψ that assigns a single payoff vec-
tor (ψi(N, v))i∈N ∈ Rn to every game (N, v). (ψi(N, v))i∈N is a distribution of the total
wealth available to all the players through their participation in the game (N, v). Throu-
ghout this paper we focus on the class, denoted LES, of values that satisfy Linearity,
Symmetry and Efficiency properties. Nowadays, it is well known that there is a para-
metric representation of such a class of values that is the core topic in papers by Ruiz
et al. (1998), Hermandez-Lamoneda et al. (2008) ; Driessen and Radzik (2003) ; Cha-
meni and Andjiga (2008) and more recently Chameni and Miamo (2016). The foregoing
parameterization provides a one to one correspondence between the LES values and
the sequences of n − 1 constants where n is the number of the players in the game. It
turns out that the parameterization expression constitutes a very useful tool which is
fundamental for our subsequent considerations.
The famous LES value is certainly the Shapley value (Shapley 1953) which is the
unique LES value that satisfies the null player axiom. Here, a null player is the one
whom marginal contribution to any coalition that does not contain him is zero and the
null player axiom says that the payoff of any null player is always zero, independently of
the rest of the game (N, v). Another interesting LES value is the so called Solidarity va-
lue (Nowak and Radzik (1994)) which is also characterized by the three LES properties
and a null player axiom similar to the Shapley value. But the null player scheme is quite
different although it remains linked to the marginal contribution approach. And the null
player axiom assigns a zero payoff to any null player in a game (N, v) no matter what
the entire game is. The present paper uses the two null players approach to propose and
study two broader classes of null players (players who recieve a zero payoff) for LES
values.
Based on the null player of Solidarity value approach and the foregoing paramete-
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rization of the class of LES value, Chameni Nembua (2012) extended the null player
axiom to any LES value. The author showed that every LES value can be characterized
by the three LES properties and a specific parametric null player axiom.
The present paper follows Chameni Nembua (2012) reasoning to propose another class
of null players. In addition to the Solidarity value null player approach, the paper gene-
ralizes the Shapley null player to any regular LES value. The Shapley null player axiom
is also extended to a larger one called the Average Null Player axiom. The forms of
the expressions of the LES values that satisfy the new axiom are studied. Thus several
new axiomatizations of some subclasses of LES values are set up with the help of our
finding. Beside, a more general result is established in the sense that two LES values
are identical if and only if they coincide on the set of null players of a given LES value.
It turns out that this approach is a very useful and convenient tool in analyzing the
LES values for TU-games.
The paper is organized as follows. Notations and some basic definitions and results
on LES values are given in Section 2. The parametric representations of LES values
are recalled. The relationship between the parametric expressions and the classical Sha-
pley value and Solidarity value is etablished. Section 3 is concerned with null players
for LES values. Two classes of null players are introduced. One of the main result of
the paper provides a characterization of LES in terms of what the value assigns to
null players. Section 4 is devoted to the applications of results established in section
3. Several axioms involving LES properties based on their parametric representation
are studied as well as the characterizations of subclasses of LES values these axioms
induce. Section 5 introduces the Average Null Player concept. It is shown that the Sha-
pley value in fact has a broader class of null players and the result is then extended to
all regular LES values. Some final comments conclude the paper in Section 6 and some
of the proofs, which are technical calculations, are relegated to the appendix in Section 7.
2 Notations and Preliminaries
The cardinality of any set S is denoted by |S| or simply with the appropriate small
letter s. Consider a TU-game (N, v) with N a finite set of players such as n > 1. Som-
time, when N is fixed and there is no confusion, the TU-game (N, v) is simply denoted
by the characteristic function v and we denote Γ(N) the set of all transferable utility
games v on N , it is well known that Γ(N) is a vector space of 2n − 1 dimension. Also,
for notational convention we will write singleton {i} as i.
Player i ∈ N is a classical Shapley null player in the game (N, v) if v(S)−v(S\i) = 0 for
all S 3 i. Two players i, j ∈ N are symmetric in the game (N, v) if v(S + i) = v(S + j)
for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
For a coalition T ⊆ N , the unanimity game associated to T , is the game defined by :
uT=
{
1 if T ⊆ S
0 if otherwise
It is well known that the family of unanimity games constitutes a basis of the linear
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space Γ(N) that plays an essential role in TU-games.
A value on Γ(N) is a function ψ that assigns a single payoff vector (ψi(N, v))i∈N ∈ Rn
to every game (N, v). When there is not confusion, the vector (ψi(N, v))i∈N ∈ Rn is sim-
ply denoted ψ(v).
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) is the value Shap given by :
Shapi(v) =
∑
S3i
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
(v(S)− v(S\i)).
The Solidarity value (Nowak and Radzik, 1994) is the value given by :
Soli(v) =
∑
S3i
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
Av(S) where Av(S) = 1
s
∑
k∈S [v(S)− v(S\k)].
A value ψ on Γ(N) is said to be linear if ψi(N,αv + βw) = αψi(N, v) + βψi(N,w)
for all games (N, v), (N,w), for all player i ∈ N and for all α, β ∈ R. ψ on Γ(N) is sym-
metric if for all games (N, v) and for any automorphism pi of v, ψi(N, v) = ψpi(i)(N, piv).
Finally a value ψ on Γ(N) possesses the efficiency property if
∑
i∈N ψi(N, v) = v(N).
Now, we quote two results about the parametric representation for LES values and
null players.
Proposition 2.1. Consider a set of player N of cardinality n and Γ(N) the set of all
transferable utility games (N, v). Then the following statements, for a value φ on Γ(N),
are equivalent :
i) φ is a LES value on Γ(N).
ii) There exists a unique collection of n− 1 constants a(s)n−1s=1 such that, for any i ∈ N ,
ψi(N, v) =
v(N)
n
+
n−1∑
s=1
a(s)
[
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
∑
S3i
v(S)− (n− s− 1)!s!
n!
∑
i/∈S
v(S)
]
(1)
iii) There exists a unique collection of n constants a(s)ns=1 with a(n) = 1, such that, for
any i ∈ N ,
ψi(N, v) =
∑
S3i
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
[a(s)v(S)− a(s− 1)v(S\i)] . (2)
Proposition 2.2. Consider a set of player N of cardinality n and Γ(N) the set of all
transferable utility games (N, v). Then the following statements, for a value ψ on Γ(N),
are equivalent :
i) ψ is a LES value on Γ(N).
ii) There exists a unique collection of n− 1 constants b(s)ns=2 such that, for any i ∈ N ,
and for any S 3 i, if
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Bi(S)=
 b(s) [v(S)− v(S\i)] + 1− b(s)s− 1
∑
j∈S\i [v(S)− v(S\j)] if S > 1
v(i) if S = 1
ψi(N, v) =
v(i)
n
+
∑
S3i
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
Bi(S). (3)
iii) There exists a unique collection of n constants b(s)ns=1 with b(1) = 1 such that, for
any i ∈ N , and for any S 3 i, if
Bi(S)=
 b(s) [v(S)− v(S\i)] + 1− b(s)s− 1
∑
j∈S\i [v(S)− v(S\j)] if S > 1
b(s)v(i) if S = 1
ψi(N, v) =
∑
S3i
(n− s)!(s− 1)!
n!
Bi(S). (4)
Remark 2.1. It is easy to see that formula (2) generalizes the classical Shapley value.
The marginal contribution term v(s)− v(S\i) is replaced by a weighted marginal contri-
bution a(s)v(s)− a(s− 1)v(S\i).
In the literature formula (2) is attributed to Ruiz et al. (1998) who had established an
equivalent expression. But the current form of the formula appeared very recently in the
literature (see Chameni and Andjiga (2008), Radzick and Driessen (2013)) for the sake
of getting closer to the classical Shapley value expression.
Remark 2.2. Formula (3) or (4) is more general as it provides an extension of the clas-
sical representation of the Solidarity value (where b(s) =
1
s
) and Shapley value (where
b(s) = 1). The formula has been established by Chameni Nembua (2012) and it is worth
noting that the sequence (collection of constants) in (2) is linked to the sequence in (4)
by the relation : b(s) = a(s− 1) s = 2, 3, · · · , n and b(1) = a(n) = 1.
The mathematical expression of formulae (3) and (4) may seems complex but their so-
cial interpretation are clear : Suppose that 0 ≤ b(s) ≤ 1, when player i joins S\i to
form S, he/she receives b(s)[v(S) − v(S\i)] which corresponds to a fraction of his/her
marginal contribution while the incumbents in S\i receive the rest in equal shares.
When player j joins S\j to form S, incumbent i receives additional individual share
1− b(s)
s− 1 [v(S) − v(S\j)]. Thus Bi(S) is i’s conditional expected payoff given formation
of S by the addition of any one player.
Definition 2.1. A LES value ψ on Γ(N) is considered to be :
1) Regular if the constants a(s)ns=1 in its representation (2) are all different from zero
2) Positively regular if the constants a(s)ns=1 in its representation (2) are all greater than
zero.
3) Singular if at least one of the constants a(s)ns=1 in its representation (2) is equal to
zero.
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Note that, the positive regularity of a LES value implies that the value is regular.
Most of the classical LES values such as Shapley value, Solidarity value and Consen-
sus value are positively regular. The Equal Split value (or Egalitarian value) defined
by Ei(N, v) =
v(N)
n
(i.e. the worth v(N) of the grand coalition N is equally divided
between all the players) is a special case of singularity since only one, a(n) which equal
to 1, of its constants a(s)ns=1 is different from zero.
Also note that regular LES values play a crucial role in TU-games analysis. Any
regular LES value gives the possibility of rescaling as explained in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Γ(N) is the linear space of all game (N, v).
1. Consider any LES value φ (with sequence aφ(s)ns=1) and any regular LES value ψ
(with sequence aψ(s)ns=1) then, for any Game (N, v) ∈ Γ(N), φ(v) = ψ(v
φ
ψ ) where
v
φ
ψ is the rescaled game defined by v
φ
ψ (S) =
aφ(s)
aψ(s)
v(S) for all S ⊆ N .
2. A family of games {vT , T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅} constitutes a base of linear space Γ(N)
if and only if
{
v
φ
ψ
T , T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅
}
constitutes a base of Γ(N) for any regular
values φ and ψ.
Proof: See Appendix.
The part 1. of the lemma is a strengthened version of result discussed in earlier
paper (see Theorem 1 in Chameni and Andjiga, 2008) where the regular value ψ is
the Shapley value. Note that part 2. of the lemma is particularly true when the basis
{vT , T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅} is such that the games vT are unanimity games.
3 Null Players for LES values in TU-games
In this section we study two classes of null players in TU-games and their repre-
sentations. The first class which is based on representation (4) of LES values has been
introduced by Chameni Nembua (2012). While the second class, based on the represen-
tation (2) of LES values, is new 1 and not studied yet even if it is directly inspired from
the classical Shapley null player.
Let us consider a TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ(N), any player i ∈ N and any coalition S 3 i.
Now consider a LES value ψ on Γ(N) which the constants in its representation (2) and
(4) are (a(s)ns=1) and (b(s)ns=1) respectively.
Then set Avi (S) = a(s)v(S)− a(s− 1)v(S\i) and
1. Radzik and Driessen (2016), in a very recent paper have independently defined and studied some
properties of this class of null players.
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Bvi (S)=
 b(s) [v(S)− v(S\i)] + 1− b(s)s− 1
∑
j∈S\i [v(S)− v(S\j)] if S > 1
b(s)v(i) if S = 1
When no confusion arises Avi (S) and Bvi (S) are simply denoted Ai(S) and Bi(S).
Definition 3.1. In a TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) and for any LES value ψ on Γ(N), a
player i is said to be :
a) Null player in Shapley sense in the game (N, v) for ψ if Ai(S) = 0 for all S 3 i.
b) Null player in Solidarity sense in the game (N, v) for ψ if Bi(S) = 0 for all S 3 i.
For some classical LES values, the condition for nullity can be simply expressed. For
example, in a game (N, v) ∈ Γ(N), a player is null in the both senses for Shap value if
v(S) = v(S\i) for all S 3 i. Thus the two classes of Null player are generalization of the
classical Shapley Null player.
For the Sol value, a player is null in Shapley sense if

v(S)
s+ 1
=
v(S\i)
s
v(N) =
v(N\i)
n
for all S 3 i.
While a player is null in Solidarity sense if v(S) =
1
s
∑
j∈S v(S\j) for all S 3 i.
Concerning the Egalitarian value, the nullity in Shapley sense seems surprising, this
arrives only if v(N) = 0 and when it is the case, all the players in the game are null.
While a player i is null in Solidarity sense if v(S) = 0 for all S 3 i. Sometimes in the
literature such a player is called a Nullifying player (see Van Den Brink, 2007). Thus,
for the Egalitarian value, the nullity of a player in Solidarity sense implies its nullity in
Shapley sense ; but not the converse.
Remark 3.1. Except the particular case of the Shap value for which the two kinds of
nullity coincide, for any other LES value ψ on Γ(N), the two concepts are distinct
meaning that in a TU-game (N, v), a null player in Shapley sense for ψ is not necessary
a null player in Solidarity sense for ψ and vice versa.
For example, in the unanimity game uT with t > 1, for any non productive player
i ∈ N\T ,
Ai(S)=
{
a(s)− a(s− 1) if T ⊆ S
0 otherwise
and Bi(S)=
 1− b(s)s− 1 t if T ⊆ S0 otherwise
thus, if ψ is a LES value such that a(s) = 1 for s = t − 1, t, . . . , n. then player i is
null in the both senses for ψ ; this is particularly true for Shapley value. Besides, for any
other LES value, i is never null in one or the other sense.
The next lemma stresses some intuitive properties of the two classes of null players.
Lemma 3.1. Let ϕ be any LES value on Γ(N).
1) If a player i ∈ N is null in Shapley sense (respectively, in Solidarity sense) for ϕ
in the two TU-games (N, v) and (N,w) then i is also a null player in Shapley sense
(respectively, in Solidarity sense) for ϕ in the TU-game (N,αv+ βw) for any α, β ∈ R.
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2) If ϕ is a regular LES value and i, j ∈ N are two null players in Shapley sense for ϕ
in the TU-game (N, v) then i and j are symmetric players in (N, v).
3) If i, j ∈ N are two null players in Solidarity sense for the LES value ϕ (regular or
not) in the TU-game (N, v) then i and j are symmetric players in (N, v).
Proof: See Appendix.
The first statement of lemma (3.1) clearly shows that, the set of all TU-games in
which a given player is null (in one or the other sense) for a fixed LES value constitutes
a linear subspace of Γ(N). While the second and the third statements elucidate the fact
that two null players for a fixed LES value are always symmetric players. This means in
particular that, in a TU-game (N, v) any LES value assigns the same amount of payoff
to null players for a fixed LES value. However, the symmetry of two null players in
Shapley sense in a TU-game (N, v) may not hold for some singular values. This is in
particular the case of the Egalitarian value for which the condition of nullity in Shapley
sense in a game (N, v) requieres only that v(N) = 0.
Remark 3.2. It is easy to see that if i is a null player (in one or the other sense) for
the LES value ψ in the game (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) then ψi(N, v) = 0 regardless of the rest
of the game . Thus a null player always receives zero as its payoff from the LES value
for which he/she is null. Then it would be interesting to focus on what a LES value
gives to a null player of another LES value. In the sequel, we show that the control of
what any LES value ϕ assigns to null players (of other values) gives an significant extra
information about the characterization of ϕ.
Theorem 3.1. (Null player equal payoff for two LES values)
Consider two LES values ϕ and φ on Γ(N), then
1) ϕ and φ coincide on Γ(N) (i.e. ϕ = φ) if and only if there exists a regular LES
value ψ on Γ(N) such that for any game (N, v), ϕi(N, v) = φi(N, v) whenever i is
a null player in Shapley sense for ψ in (N, v).
But the coincidence of the values ϕ and φ on Γ(N) may fail when the LES value
ψ is not regular.
2) ϕ and φ coincide on Γ(N) (i.e. ϕ = φ) if and only if there exists a LES value
ψ ( regular or not) on Γ(N) such that for any game (N, v), ϕi(N, v) = φi(N, v)
whenever i is a null player in Solidarity sense for ψ in (N, v).
Proof: See Appendix.
It worth noting that, the first part of statement 1) of theorem (3.1) concerns only
regular LES values. The second part of statement 1) says that, the result of the first
part is still valid for some singular LES values but not for all of them as demonstrated
in the proof. Statement 2) of theorem (3.1) is an equivalent version of a non published
result from Chameni (2010, see Theorem 3 there).
The next theorem highlights the case of the Egalitarian value that is a singular LES
value but for which the statement 1) is valid. We remind that in this case, the existence
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of a null player in Shapley sense in a game (N, v) is equivalent to the condition v(N) = 0.
Theorem 3.2. Two LES value ϕ and φ coincide on Γ(N) (i.e. ϕ = φ) if and only if
ϕi(N, v) = φi(N, v) for all i ∈ N and for all (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) such that v(N) = 0.
Proof: Suppose that ϕi(N, v) = φi(N, v) for all (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) such that v(N) = 0 and
for all i ∈ N . Thus for all (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) and for all i ∈ N , ϕi(v−v(N)) = φi(v−v(N)).
⇔ for all (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) and for all i ∈ N , ϕi(v)− v(N)n = φi(v)− v(N)n .⇔ for all (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) and for all i ∈ N , ϕi(v) = φi(v).
⇔ ϕ = φ
Theorem (3.1) immediately leads to next corollaries which are the extension to any LES
value of some properties hitherto discussed only in the case of the Shapley value.
Corollary 3.1. Consider two LES values ϕ and φ on Γ(N).
1. Suppose that φ is regular, if for any game (N, v) and for any i null player in
Shapley sense for φ in (N, v), we have ϕi(N, v) = 0 then ϕ = φ.
2. If for any game (N, v) and for any null player i in Solidarity sense for φ (regular
or not) in (N, v), we have ϕi(N, v) = 0 then ϕ = φ.
Proof: This immediately follows from theorem (3.1).
Corollary 3.2. Consider two LES values ϕ and φ on Γ(N).
1. If for any games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ(N), and for any i ∈ N null player in Shapley
sense for ϕ (regular value) in the two games, we have φi(v) = φi(w) . Then ϕ = φ.
2. (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ(N), and for any i ∈ N null player in Solidarity sense for ϕ in
the two games, we have φi(v) = φi(w). Then ϕ = φ.
Proof:
1) Suppose that φi(v) = φi(w) whenever i ∈ N is a null player in Shapley sense for ϕ in
any two games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ(N). This implies in particular that, if i ∈ N is a null
player in Shapley sense for ϕ in any game (N, v), then φi(v) = φi(−v) = −φi(v) (since a
null player in a game (N, v) is also null in the game (N,−v)). Thus φi(v) = 0 whenever
i is a null player in Shapley sense for ϕ in any game (N, v). Hence, from statement 1)
of corollary 3.1 ϕ = φ.
2) Just use the same line of reasoning as in the proof of 1).
Applying the same approach to the particular case of the Egalitarian value leads to the
following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. Consider two LES values ϕ and φ on Γ(N). E denotes the Egalitarian
value.
1. If for any games (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) with v(N) = 0, and for any i ∈ N we have
φi(v) = 0. Then φ = E.
2. If for any games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ(N) with v(N) = w(N) = 0, and for any i ∈ N
we have φi(v) = φi(w). Then φ = E.
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4 Applications
4.1 General properties of LES values.
In this subsection, we introduce axioms involving some properties of LES values
based on the coefficients a(s)ns=1 and b(s)ns=1 defined in (2) and (4). Some of them are
generalization of properties discussed in earlier papers while others are entirely new.
These axioms are used in the next subsection to characterize subclasses of LES values.
In the sequel we suppose that, a(s)ns=1 and b(s)ns=1 are two collections of n constants
with a(s) 6= 0, s = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, a(n) = 1 and b(1) = 1. φ is a LES value.
A1) a(s)ns=1 -Weighted Marginal ContributionWeakMonotonicity : Let (N, v) ∈
Γ (N), i ∈ N and C ∈ R. If [a(s)v(s) − a(s − 1)v(S\i)] ≥ C for all S 3 i, then
φi(v) ≥ C.
A2) a(s)ns=1 -Weighted Marginal Constant Contribution : Let (N, v) ∈ Γ (N),
i ∈ N and C ∈ R. If [a(s)v(s)− a(s− 1)v(S\i)] = C for all S 3 i, then φi(v) = C.
A3) a(s)ns=1 -Weighted Marginal Contribution Strong Monotonicity : Let (N, v), (N,w) ∈
Γ (N), i ∈ N . If [a(s)v(s)− a(s− 1)v(S \ i)] ≥ [a(s)w(s)− a(s− 1)w(S\i)] for all
S 3 i, then φi(v) ≥ φi(w).
A4) a(s)ns=1 -Weighted Marginal Contribution Equal Payoffs : Let (N, v), (N,w) ∈
Γ (N), i ∈ N,. If [a(s)v(s)− a(s− 1)v(S\i)] = [a(s)w(s)− a(s− 1)w(S\i)] for all
S 3 i, then φi(v) = φi(w).
A5) b(s)ns=1 -Marginal Coalitional Gain Weak Monotonicity : Let (N, v) ∈ Γ(N),
i ∈ N and C ∈ R.If Bvi (S) ≥ C for all S 3 i, then φi(v) ≥ C.
A6) b(s)ns=1 -Marginal Coalitional constant Gain : Let (N, v) ∈ Γ(N), i ∈ N and
C ∈ R. If Bvi (S) = C for all S 3 i, then φi(v) = C.
A7) b(s)ns=1 -Marginal Coalitional Gain Strong Monotonicity : Let (N, v),
(N,w) ∈ Γ (N), i ∈ N . If Bvi (S) ≥ Bwi (S) for all S 3 i, then φi(v) ≥ φi(w).
A8) b(s)ns=1 -Marginal Coalitional Gain Equal Payoffs : Let (N, v), (N,w) ∈
Γ (N), i ∈ N . If Bvi (S) = Bwi (S) for all S 3 i, then φi(v) = φi(w).
A9) ϕ- Shapley Null Player Equal Payoffs (ϕ is any regular LES value) : If a
player i is a null player in Shapley sense for ϕ in two games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ (N)
with v(N) = w(N) , then φi(v) = φi(w).
A10) ϕ- Solidarity Null Player Equal Payoffs (ϕ is any LES value) : If a player i
is a null player in Solidarity sense for ϕ in two games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ (N) with
v(N) = w(N) , then φi(v) = φi(w).
A11) ϕ- Shapley Null Player a−Average Payoff(ϕ is any regular LES value, a ∈
R) : If a player i is a null player in Shapley sense for ϕ in the game (N, v) ∈ Γ (N)
then φi(v) = av(N)n .
A12) ϕ- Solidarity Null Player a−Average Payoff(ϕ is any LES value, a ∈ R) :
If a player i is a null player in Solidarity sense for ϕ in the game (N, v) ∈ Γ (N)
then φi(v) = av(N)n .
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A13) ϕ- Shapley Null Player aψ -Payoff (ϕ is regular, ψ is any LES value, a ∈ R) :
If a player i is a null player in Shapley sense for ϕ in the game (N, v) ∈ Γ (N) then
φi(v) = aψi(v).
A14) ϕ- Solidarity Null Player aψ -Payoff (ϕ, ψ are any LES value, a ∈ R) : If a
player i is a null player in Solidarity sense for ϕ in the game (N, v) ∈ Γ (N) then
φi(v) = aψi(v).
It is clear that these fortheen axioms are not independent, the lemma below highlights
some of their links.
Lemma 4.1. Let φ be any LES value on Γ(N), a(s)ns=1 and b(s)ns=1 are two collections
of n constants with a(s) 6= 0, s = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, a(n) = 1 and b(1) = 1.
1. A1⇒ A2 :
If φ verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Contribution Weak Monotonicity then φ
verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Constant Contribution.
2. A3⇒ A4 :
If φ verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Contribution Strong Monotonicity then φ
verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Contributions Equal Payoffs.
3. A5⇒ A6 :
If φ verifies b(s)ns=1-Marginal Coalitional Gain Weak Monotonicity then φ verifies
b(s)ns=1-Marginal Coalitional constant Gain.
4. A7⇒ A8 :
If φ verifies b(s)ns=1-Marginal Coalitional Gain Strong Monotonicity then φ verifies
b(s)ns=1-Marginal Coalitional Gain Equal Payoffs.
5. A13 is a particular case of A11 and A11⇐⇒ A9 :
φ verifies ϕ-Shapley Null Player Equal Payoffs (ϕ is any regular LES value) if
and only if there exist a ∈ R , φ verifies ϕ-Shapley Null Player a-Average Payoff.
6. A14 is a particular case of A12 and A12⇐⇒ A10 :
φ verifies ϕ-Solidarity Null Player Equal Payoffs (ϕ is any regular LES value) if
and only if there exist a ∈ R, φ verifies ϕ-Solidarity Null Player a-Average Payoff.
Proof: See Appendix.
4.2 Characterization of LES values.
In this subsection we use previous axioms introduced in subsection 4.1 to characterize
several subclasses of LES values.
Theorem 4.1. A LES value φ verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Constant Contribu-
tion if and only if the sequence in its representation (2) is a(s)ns=1.
Proof: Suppose that φ is a LES value that verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Constant
Contribution and consider ψa the LES value with the sequence in its representation
(2) is a(s)ns=1. If i is a null player in Shapley sense for ψa in any game (N, v) then
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[a(s)v(s)− a(s− 1)v(S\i)] = 0 for all S 3 i. Since φ verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal
Constant Contribution,φi(v) = 0. Thus from assertion 1) in corollary (3.1), φ = ψa.
conversely, if φ = ψa, using representation (2) of ψa directly leads to the result.
Corollary 4.1. A LES value φ verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Contribution Weak
Monotonicity if and only if the sequence in its representation (2) is a(s)ns=1.
Proof: If φ is a LES value that verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Contribution Weak
Monotonicity, then from assertion 1) in lemma (4.1), φ verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Margi-
nal Constant Contribution, therefore from theorem (4.1), φ = ψa, where ψa is the LES
value with the sequence in its representation (2) equal a(s)ns=1.
The converse is obvious from representation (2) of φ.
This is a generalization of the strong monotonicity discussed by Young (1985). The au-
thor proved, in the case of a(s) = 1, s = 1, 2, . . . , n, that the property is sufficient to
characterize the Shapley value.
Theorem 4.2. A LES value φ verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Contributions Equal
Payoffs if and only if the sequence in its representation (2) is a(s)ns=1.
Proof: Suppose that φ is a LES value verifying a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Contri-
butions Equal Payoffs property, consider ψa the LES value with the sequence in its
representation (2) equal a(s)ns=1. If i is a null player in Shapley sense for ψa in any game
(N, v) then [a(s)v(s)−a(s−1)v(S \ i)] = 0 for all S 3 i, if (N,w) is the zero game (that
is w(S) = 0 for all coalition S), then
[a(s)v(s) − a(s − 1)v(S \ i)] = [a(s)w(s) − a(s − 1)w(S \ i)] for all S 3 i, therefore
φi(v) = φi(w) = 0. Thus from assertion 1) in corollary 3.1, φ = ψa.
The converse is obvious from representation (2) of φ.
Corollary 4.2. A LES value φ verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Contribution Strong
Monotonicity : if and only if the sequence in its representation (2) is a(s)ns=1.
Proof: If φ is a LES value that verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Marginal Contribution Strong
Monotonicity, then from assertion 2) in lemma (4.1), φ verifies a(s)ns=1-Weighted Mar-
ginal Contributions Equal Payoffs , therefore from Theorem (4.2), φ = ψa, where ψa is
the LES value with the sequence in its representation (2) equal a(s)ns=1.
The converse is obvious from representation (2) of φ.
Theorem 4.3. A LES value φ verifies b(s)ns=1-Marginal Coalitional constant Gain if
and only if the sequence in its representation (4) is b(s)ns=1.
Proof: Suppose that φ is a LES value satisfying b(s)ns=1- Marginal Coalitional constant
Gain. and consider ψb the LES value with the sequence in its representation (4) is
b(s)ns=1. If i is a null player in Solidarity sense for ψb in any game (N, v) then Bvi (S) = 0
for all S 3 i. Since φ verifies b(s)ns=1- Marginal Coalitional Constant Gain, φi(v) = 0.
Thus from assertion 2) in corollary 3.1, φ = ψb.
The converse is obvious from representation (4) of φ.
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Corollary 4.3. A LES value φ verifies b(s)ns=1-Marginal Coalitional Gain Weak Mono-
tonicity if and only if the sequence in its representation (4) is b(s)ns=1.
Proof: If φ is a LES value that verifies b(s)ns=1-Marginal Coalitional Gain Weak Mono-
tonicity, then from assertion 3) in lemma (4.1), φ verifies b(s)ns=1- Marginal Coalitional
Constant Gain, therefore from theorem (4.3), φ = ψb, where ψb is the LES value with
the sequence in its representation (4) equal b(s)ns=1.
The converse is obvious from representation (4) of φ.
Theorem 4.4. A LES value φ verifies b(s)ns=1- Marginal Coalitional Gain Equal Payoffs
if and only if the sequence in its representation (4) is b(s)ns=1.
Proof: Suppose that φ is a LES value verifying b(s)ns=1- Marginal Coalitional Gain Equal
Payoffs property, consider ψb the LES value with the sequence in its representation (4)
equal b(s)ns=1. If i is a null player in Solidarity sense for ψb in any game (N, v) then
Bvi (S) = 0 for all S 3 i, if (N,w) is the zero game (that is w(S) = 0 for all coalition S),
then Bvi (S) = Bwi (S) for all S 3 i, therefore φi(v) = φi(w) = 0. Thus from assertion 2)
in corollary (3.1), φ = ψb.
The converse is obvious from representation (4) of φ.
Corollary 4.4. A LES value φ verifies b(s)ns=1-Marginal Coalitional Gain Weak Mo-
notonicity if and only if the sequence in its representation (4) is b(s)ns=1.
Proof: If φ is a LES value that verifies b(s)ns=1-Marginal Coalitional Gain Weak Mono-
tonicity, then from assertion 4) in lemma (4.1), φ verifies b(s)ns=1- Marginal Coalitional
Gain Equal Payoffs, therefore from theorem (4.4), φ = ψb, where ψb is the LES value
with the sequence in its representation (4) equal b(s)ns=1.
The converse is obvious from representation (4) of φ.
Theorem 4.5. A LES value φ verifies ϕ-Shapley Null Player aψ-Payoffs (ϕ is regular,
ψ is any LES value, a ∈ R), if and only if φ = aψ + (1− a)ϕ.
Proof: φ verifies ϕ-Shapley Null Player aψ-Payoffs⇔ φi(v) = aψi(v) for any null player
i in Shapley sense for ϕ in any game (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) ⇔ φi(v) = aψi(v) + (1− a)ϕi(v) for
any null player i in Shapley sense for ϕ in any game (N, v) ∈ Γ(N)⇔ φ = aψ+(1−a)ϕ
according to assertion 1) of theorem (3.1).
Theorem (4.5) is a general finding that set up the characterization of any regular
LES value ϕ (when the constant a = 0) in the same way as the classical characterization
of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). Note that when a = 1 the outcome of the theorem
(4.5) coincides with the first part of theorem (3.1). Also note that, according to the
discussion in Section 3 about the Egalitarian value, the result of theorem (4.5) is still
valid when the value ϕ is the Egalitarian value.
Besides, Theorem (4.5) engenders many others results discussed in earlier papers. For
instance, the theorem leads to :
a. The characterization of the Shapley value (Shapley,1953) when a = 0 and ϕ = Shap.
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b. The characterization of the a- consensus value (due to Ju, Born and Ruys, 2007)
when ϕ is the Equal Surplus value and ψ is the Egalitarian value.
c. theorem of Yang (1997) when ϕ is the Shapley value and ψ is the Egalitarian value.
d. And more recently, the characterization of LES values satisfying the Per-Capita
Null Player a-Average Payoffs axiom (Radzik and Driessen, 2016) when ϕ is the
Per-Capita value and ψ is the Egalitarian value.
Theorem 4.6. E denotes the Egalitarian value.
A LES value φ verifies ϕ-Shapley Null Player a-Average Payoff (ϕ is any regular LES
value,a ∈ R), if and only if φ = aE + (1− a)ϕ.
Proof: This is a particular case of theorem (4.5) with ψ equal Egalitarian value.
Theorem 4.7. E denotes the Egalitarian value.
A LES value φ verifies ϕ-Shapley Null Player Equal Payoffs (ϕ is any regular LES
value), if and only if φ is of the form φ = aE + (1− a)ϕ, for a ∈ R.
Proof: This is a direct outcome of Theorem (4.6) and assertion 5) of lemma (4.1).
Theorem 4.8. A LES value φ verifies ϕ-Solidarity Null Player ϕ-Payoff (ϕ and ψ are
any LES value, a ∈ R), if and only if φ = aψ + (1− a)ϕ.
Proof: φ verifies ϕ-Solidarity Null Player aψ-Payoff⇔ φi(v) = aψi(v) for any null player
i in Solidarity sense for ϕ in any game (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) ⇔ φi(v) = aψi(v) + (1− a)ϕi for
any null player i in Solidarity sense for ϕ in any game (N, v) ∈ Γ(N)⇔ φ = aψ+(1−a)ϕ
according to assertion 2) of theorem (3.1).
Clearly, Theorem (4.8) provides a solid approach to characterize any LES value. Theo-
rem (4.8) is at least as general as theorem (4.5). The theorem is based on the Null
player in Solidarity sense which is clearly more demanding than the Null player in Sha-
pley sense. However the improvement is the free regularity of the value ϕ. Thus the
result of the theorem is valid not only for the regular LES values but also for singular
LES values.
Theorem 4.9. E denotes the Egalitarian value.
A LES value φ verifies ϕ-Solidarity Null Player a-Average Payoff (ϕ is any LES value,
a ∈ R), if and only if φ = aE + (1− a)ϕ.
Proof: This is a particular case of theorem (4.8) with ψ equal to Egalitarian value.
Theorem 4.10. E denotes the Egalitarian value.
A LES value φ verifies ϕ-Solidarity Null Player Equal Payoffs (ϕ is any LES value),
if and only if φ is of the form φ = aE + (1− a)ϕ, for a ∈ R.
Proof: This is a direct outcome of Theorem (4.9) and assertion 6) of lemma (4.1).
To end the section, let us state two results that are strengthened versions, in terms
of convex combinations, of theorem (4.8) and theorem (4.5).
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Corollary 4.5. φ, ψ1, ψ2, ..., ψp are any p+ 1 LES value on Γ(N) ; c1, c2, ..., cp are any
p constant numbers.
1) Consider any regular LES value ϕ on Γ(N).
If for any TU-game (N, v) and for any i ∈ N null player for ϕ in Shapley sense in
(N, v), φi(v) =
∑p
s=1 csψ
s
i (v) then φ is of the form φ = (1−
∑p
s=1 cs)ϕ+
∑p
s=1 csψ
s.
2) Consider any LES value ϕ on Γ(N).
If for any TU-game (N, v) and for any i ∈ N null player for ϕ in Solidarity sense in
(N, v), φi(v) =
∑p
s=1 csψ
s
i (v) then φ is of the form φ = (1−
∑p
s=1 cs)ϕ+
∑p
s=1 csψ
s.
5 Average null players
In this section, a new class of Null players in TU-game is introduced. The class is
directely inspired from Shapley (1953) Null player. But rather than considering marginal
contribution in each coalition, the mean of marginal contributions is taken into the
account. It turn out that, the class contains the Shapley null players and thus many of
the results found in the literature based on Shapley null players are still valid for the
new concepts of null players.
5.1 Average null players for Shapley value
Let (N, v) be a TU-game in Γ(N). For any player i ∈ N , set uk(i) =
∑
S3i;|S|=k v(S).
uk(i) reflects the productivity of player i in the game (N, v) when only the coalitions of
size k are taking into account.
u(i) =

u1(i)
u2(i)
...
un(i)
 is the productivity vector of the player i in the game.
Now, set mvik =
1
(n−1k−1)
uk(i). mvik is the average productivity of the player i in the game
(N, v) when only the coalitions of size k are taking into account.
In the same spirit we set :
mvik =
1
(n−1k )
∑
i/∈S;|S|=k v(S). m
v
ik is the mean of worths of all coalitions size k non
containing player i.
mvk =
1
(nk)
∑
|S|=k v(S). m
v
k is the mean of worths of all coalitions size k.
When no confusion is possible, mvik, mvik and mvk are simply respectively written mik,
mik and mk.
We can now state two results in the next corollary which will be used in our subsequent
considerations.
Corollary 5.1. For any TU-game (N, v), if ψ is any LES value with the constants
a(k)n−1k=1 in its representation (2), then for all i ∈ N ,
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1) ψi(N, v) =
v(N)
n
+
∑n−1
k=1 a(k)
mik−mk
n−k .
2) ψi(N, v) =
v(N)
n
+
∑n−1
k=1 a(k)
mik−mik
n
=
∑n
k=1 a(k)
mik−mik
n
, with an = 1 and min = 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Corollary (5.1) gives another representation of LES value in terms of average produc-
tivity of players instead of marginal contribution of players as it is usualy the case since
the famous work of Shapley (1953). This representation directly leads to new symmetric
players and new null player definitions.
Definition 5.1. Two players i, j ∈ N are said to be average symmetric in the game
(N, v), if they have the same productivity vecteur in (N, v). Formally, i and j are average
symmetric if : mik = mjk for all k = 1, 2, ..., n.
Note that if i and j are two symmetric players in the game (N, v) (that is v(S+ i) =
v(S+ j) for all S ⊆ N \{i, j}) then players i and j are also average symmetric in (N, v).
The converse is always true when the number of the players in the game is n ≤ 3.
However, two players can be average symmetric without being symmetric if n ≥ 4 as
it is illustrated in the following game where players 1 and 2 are average symmetric but
not symmetric.
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, v(1) = 1, v(2) = 1, v(3) = 2, v(4) = 1, v(1, 2) = 2, v(1, 3) = 1,
v(1, 4) = 3, v(2, 3) = 4, v(2, 4) = 0, v(3, 4) = 5, v(1, 2, 3) = 4, v(1, 2, 4) = 1,
v(2, 3, 4) = 4.
Here, the productivity vector of players 1 and 2 are u(1) = u(2) =
 16
9
.
The next result characterizes average symmetric players in term of LES values.
Proposition 5.1. Consider a TU-game (N, v) and any two players i, j ∈ N . Then the
following statements are equivalent :
1) players i and j are average symmetric in (N, v).
2) mik = mjk for all k = 1, 2, ..., n.
3) For any LES value ϕ, ϕi(N, v) = ϕj(N, v).
Proof: See Appendix.
The particular property of a symmetric value is to assign the same amount of payoff
to symmetric players in a TU-game. Proposition (5.1) clearly shows that, when the value
is a LES one, the property is extended to the larger class of average symmetric players.
Definition 5.2. Consider a TU-game (N, v). A player i ∈ N is an average null player
in (N, v) if for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n, mik = mik−1 with mi0 = 0 and min = v(N).
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Note that, the average null player concept is an extension of the classical null player
defined by Shapley (1953). If i is a null player in a TU-game (N, v) then i is also an
average null player in (N, v). However, the converse does not hold in the sense that,
some average null players are not null player. In other words, the condition for being an
average null player is weaker than the one required to be a null player.
For example, in the following game, N = {1, 2, 3}, v(N) = 1, v(1) = 0, v(2) = 1,
v(3) = 3, v(1, 2) = 4, v(1, 3) = 0, v(2, 3) = 1.
Player 1 is an average null player but not a null player. Nevertheless, in some class
of games, the two concepts coincide. It is for instance the case if the game (N, v) is
monotonic and particulary in unanimity games as stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 5.2. Let T ⊆ N be any coalition of players and considers (N, vT ) the
unanimity game associated to T . Then for any player i ∈ N , the following statements
are equivalent.
1) i is a null player in (N, vT ).
2) i is an average null player in (N, vT ).
3) i belongs to N \ T .
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition (5.2) is certainly one of the main key results of the subsection as it clearly
establishes that null player and average null player are two concepts that coincide in
unanimity game. Knowing that the set of all unanimity games constitutes a basis of
the linear space Γ(N) that plays a central role in the characterization of LES values,
most results concerning the null player property will be also valid for average null player
property as we will see it in the sequel.
Definition 5.3. A value ϕ defined on Γ(N) possesses the average null player property
if for all TU-game (N, v), for all average null-player i in (N, v), ϕi(v) = 0.
Proposition 5.3. Given a TU-game (N, v),
1) If two players i, j ∈ N are average null in (N, v), then i and j are average symmetric
in (N, v).
2) If a player i ∈ N is an average null palyer in (N, v), then Shapi(N, v) = 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
It is well known that null player axiom is one of the characteristic properties of
Shapley value. However, null players are not solely to receive zero as shapley payoff.
Proposition (5.3) reveals that in fact, there is a broader class of players, constitued by
average null players, to whom Shapley value always assigns zero as payoff. Therefore,
the following corollary holds.
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Corollary 5.2. Shapley value is the unique LES value satisfying the average null player
property.
5.2 General average null players for LES values
Definition 5.4. Consider a TU-game (N, v) and let ϕ be any LES value with the
constants a(k)n−1k=1 in its representation (2). A player i ∈ N is an average null player for
ϕ in (N, v) if for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n,
akmik = ak−1mik−1, with an = 1, mi0 = 0 and min = v(N).
Note that, when the LES value ϕ in the definition equal to the Shapley value, the
average null player for ϕ coincides with the average null player defined in subsection
5.1. Thus this is an extension of the Shapley average null player to any LES value.
Proposition 5.4. Consider a TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) and any LES value ϕ defined
on Γ(N).
1) If ϕ is regular, any two players i, j ∈ N average null for ϕ in (N, v), are average
symmetric in (N, v).
2) If a player i ∈ N is average null for ϕ in (N, v), then ϕi(N, v) = 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Definition 5.5. Let ϕ be any LES value on Γ(N). A value φ defined on Γ(N) possesses
the ϕ-average null player property if for all TU-game (N, v) and for all i ∈ N average
null player for ϕ in (N, v), φi(v) = 0.
Theorem 5.1. Let ϕ be any regular LES value on Γ(N). Then for any LES value φ
on Γ(N), the following statements are equivalent.
1) For any TU-game (N, v) ∈ Γ(N) and for any i ∈ N null player in Shapley sense for
ϕ in (N, v), φi(v) = 0.
2) φ = ϕ.
3) φ possesses the ϕ-average null player property.
The incidence of theorem (5.1) is clear. The theorem shows that one can easly replace
along the whole text and in particular in section 4, the null player for ϕ in Shapley sense
in (N, v) by the ϕ-average null player in (N, v) and then obtain exactly the same results.
We do it in the sequel, the axioms in subsection 4.1 are rewritten in term of avarage
null player and the following corollary summarizes the impact on results in subsection
4.2. The proof of the corollary is immediate and left to the readers.
We suppose that, a(k)nk=1 is a collection of n constants with a(k) 6= 0, k = 1, 2, . . . , n−
1, a(n) = 1. φ is any LES value.
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A15) a(k)nk=1 -Weighted average contribution Weak Monotonicity : Let (N, v) ∈
Γ (N), i ∈ N and C ∈ R. If [a(k)mik − a(k − 1)mik−1] ≥ C for all k = 1, 2, ...n.,
then φi(v) ≥ C.
A16) a(k)nk=1 -Weighted average Constant Contribution : Let (N, v) ∈ Γ (N),
i ∈ N and C ∈ R. If [a(k)mik − a(k − 1)mik−1] = C for all k = 1, 2, ...n., then
φi(v) = C.
A17) a(k)nk=1 -Weighted Average Contribution Strong Monotonicity : Let (N, v), (N,w) ∈
Γ (N), i ∈ N . If [a(k)mvik − a(k − 1)mvik−1] ≥ [a(k)mwik − a(k − 1)mwik−1] for all
k = 1, 2, ...n., then φi(v) ≥ φi(w).
A18) a(k)nk=1 -Weighted Average Contribution Equal Payoffs : Let (N, v), (N,w) ∈
Γ (N), i ∈ N,. If [a(k)mvik − a(k − 1)mvik−1] = [a(k)mwik − a(k − 1)mwik−1] for all
k = 1, 2, ...n., then φi(v) = φi(w).
A19) ϕ- Average Null Player Equal Payoffs (ϕ is any regular LES value) : If a
player i is an average null player in for ϕ in two games (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ (N) with
v(N) = w(N) , then φi(v) = φi(w).
A20) ϕ- Average Null Player a−Average Payoff(ϕ is any regular LES value,
a ∈ R) : If a player i is an average null player for ϕ in the game (N, v) ∈ Γ (N)
then φi(v) = av(N)n .
A21) ϕ- Average Null Player aψ -Payoff (ϕ is regular, ψ is any LES value, a ∈ R) :
If a player i is an average null player for ϕ in the game (N, v) ∈ Γ (N) then
φi(v) = aψi(v).
Corollary 5.3.
1) A LES value φ verifies a(k)nk=1-Weighted Average Contribution Weak Monotonicity
if and only if the sequence in its representation (2) is a(k)nk=1.
2) A LES value φ verifies a(k)nk=1-Weighted Average Constant Contribution if and only
if the sequence in its representation (2) is a(k)nk=1.
3) A LESvalue φ verifies a(k)nk=1-Weighted Average Constant Strong Monotonicity if
and only if the sequence in its representation (2) is a(k)nk=1.
4) A LES value φ verifies a(k)nk=1-Weighted Average Contribution Equal Payoffs if and
only if the sequence in its representation (2) is a(k)nk=1.
5) A LES value φ verifies ϕ-Average Null Player Equal Payoffs(ϕ is any regular LES
value) if and only if φ is of the form φ = aE + (1− a)ϕ, for a ∈ R.
6) A LES value φ verifies ϕ-Average Null Player a−Average Payoffs(ϕ is any regular
LES value, a ∈ R) if and only if φ is of the form φ = aE + (1− a)ϕ.
7) A LES value φ verifies ϕ-Average Null Player aψ-Payoffs(ϕ is regular, ψ is any LES
value, a ∈ R) if and only if φ = aψ + (1− a)ϕ.
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6 Concluding Remarks
In the present paper, we have conducted a general study of null players for LES
values. Basing on two representations formula for such values, we have set up two classes
of null players. An interesting open question is how to know if there do not exist other
classes of null players for LES values. The concept of average null player have been
defined. In this regard, it has been noted that, in monotonic games, a player is average
null if and only if he/she is a classical Shapley null player. Thus, it is interesting to
characterize the whole class of games in which the two concepts of null players coincide.
The paper has clearly shown that the control of what a LES value assigns to null
players constitutes a good tool to characterize the value. We have provided many results
characterizing several families of LES values using this approach. But some of the results
are establihsed only for regular values. It seems interesting to see how to extend the
forgoing results to a broader class of LES values and why not to the whole set of LES
values.
7 Appendix
Proof of lemma 2.1
1. We prove that, for any player i ∈ N , φi(v) = ψi(v
φ
ψ ). According to formula (2),
for any i ∈ N ,
ψi(v
φ
ψ ) =
∑
S3i
(n− s)(s− 1)
n!
[
aψ(s)
aφ(s)
aψ(s)
v(S)− aψ(s− 1)a
φ(s− 1)
aψ(s− 1)v(S\i)
]
=
∑
S3i
(n− s)(s− 1)
n!
[
aφ(s)v(S)− aφ(s− 1)v(S\i)]
= φi(v).
2. Suppose that φ and ψ are two regular LES values. Thus
aφ(s)
aψ(s)
6= 0 for all
s = 1, 2, . . . , n. We need only to prove that
{
v
φ
ψ
T , T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅
}
constitutes
a set of linear independent vectors.
Assume that
∑
T⊆N αTv
φ
ψ
T = 0 with αT ∈ R for all T ⊆ N , then∑
T⊆N αTv
φ
ψ
T (S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N ⇔
∑
T⊆N αT
aφ(s)
aψ(s)
vT (S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N
⇔ ∑T⊂N αTvT (S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N
⇔ ∑T⊂N αTvT = 0 for all S ⊆ N
⇔ αT = 0 for all T ⊆ N.
Since {vT , T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅} constitutes a base of Γ(N). Thus
{
v
φ
ψ
T , T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅
}
constitutes a set of linear independent vectors of Γ(N). Hence
{
v
φ
ψ
T , T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅
}
is
a basis of Γ(N).
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Proof of lemma 3.1
1) The proof is direct since the condition for being null player (in the both senses) in
a TU-game (N, v) is a linear expression relatively to v. The details are left to the readers.
2) Suppose ϕ is a regular value and denote a(s)ns=1 the sequence in its represen-
tation (2). As ϕ is regular, as 6= 0 for s = 1, 2, ...n. Consider any two null players
in Shapley sense for ϕ in (N, v). If S is a coalition such that S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. i and
j null player in Shapley sense value for ϕ in (N, v) ⇒ a(s + 1)v(S + i) = a(s)v(S)
and a(s + 1)v(S + j) = a(s)v(S) ⇒ a(s + 1)v(S + i) = a(s)v(S) = a(s + 1)v(S + j)
⇒ v(S + i) = v(S + j)as a(s + 1) 6= 0. Hence, since this is valid for any coalition
S ⊆ N \ {i, j}, the two players i and j are symmetric in (N, v).
3) Consider any i, j, two null players in Solidarity sense for a LES value ϕ in (N, v).
Denote b(s)ns=1 the sequence in the representation (4) of ϕ. If S is a coalition such that
S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. Then,
b(s+ 1) [v(S + i)− v(S)] + 1− b(s+ 1)
s
∑
i′∈S [v(S + i)− v(S + i\i′)] = 0 and v(i) = 0
b(s+1) [v(S + j)− v(S)]+ 1− b(s+ 1)
s
∑
i′∈S [v(S + j)− v(S + j\i′)] = 0 and v(j) = 0
rearrange the terms leads to :
v(S + i) =
1− b(s+ 1)
s
∑
i′∈S v(S + i\i′) + bs+1v(S) and v(i) = 0.
v(S + j) =
1− b(s+ 1)
s
∑
i′∈S v(S + j\i′) + bs+1v(S) and v(j) = 0.
Now, let us show by induction relatively to the size of coalition S that v(S+i) = v(S+j)
for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}. If s = 0, v(S + i) = v(i) = v(j) = v(S + j) = 0, thus the property
is satisfied.
Suppose that the property is satisfied for all S of size k and let us show that the property
is also satisfied for all S with size k + 1. If S is any coalition of size k + 1 such that
S ⊆ N \ {i, j},
v(S + i) =
1− b(s+ 1)
s
∑
i′∈S v(S + i\i′) + bs+1v(S) .
v(S + j) =
1− b(s+ 1)
s
∑
i′∈S v(S + j\i′) + bs+1v(S) .
Considering that S\i′ for i′ ∈ S is a coalition fo size k, the property is valid for S\i′,
therefore v(S + i\i′) = v(S + j\i′) for all i′ ∈ S, hence v(S + i) = v(S + j).
Proof of theorem 3.1
The approach here consist to define a base for the linear space Γ(N) in which the two
LES values ϕ and φ coincide.
1) Suppose that ϕ and φ are such that ϕi(N, v) = φi(N, v) whenever i is a null player
in Shapley sense for a regular LES value ψ in any (N, v) ∈ Γ(N). Let us consider that
a(s)ns=1 are the constants in the representation (2) of ψ. Since ψ is regular, a(s) 6= 0,
s = 1, 2, . . . , n. Now for any coalition T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, consider the game
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wT (S)=

1
a(s)
if T ⊆ S
0 if T * S
We show that :
a) {wT , T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅} constitutes a base of Γ(N).
b) For any non empty coalition T , i is a null player in Shapley sense for ψ in wT if and
only if i ∈ N\T .
c) ϕ and φ coincide in the base {wT , T ⊆ S, T 6= ∅}.
Let us start,
a) From Lemma 2.1 statement 2) {wT , T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅} constitutes a base of Γ(N) since
wT = v
φ
ψ
T where vT is the unanimity game vT (S)=
{
1 if T ⊆ S
0 if T * S and φ is the Shapley
value.
b) Consider a player i ∈ N\T , for any coalition S 3 i, if T ⊆ S then T ⊆ S\i thus,
Ai(S) = a(s)wT (S)− a(s− 1)wT (S\i) = a(s)
a(s)
− a(s− 1)
a(s− 1) = 1− 1 = 0.
If T * S then T * S\i thus, Ai(S) = a(s)wT (S)− a(s− 1)wT (S\i) = 0− 0 = 0.
Hence, i is a null player in Shapley sense for ψ in wT .
Conversely, if i /∈ N\T , then T 3 i and T * T\i thus,
Ai(T ) = a(t)wT (T )−a(s−1)wT (T\i) = a(t)wT (T ) = 1. Therefore, player i is not a null
player in Shapley sense for ψ in the game wT .
c) Suppose that ϕ and φ are two LES values such that for any game (N, v),
ϕi(N, v) = φi(N, v) whenever i is a null player in Shapley sense for ψ in (N, v).
Thus for any non empty coalition T , we have ϕi(wT ) = φi(wT ) for any i ∈ N\T . Setting
h(wT ) = ϕi(wT ) = φi(wT ) for any i ∈ N\T , by Symmetry and Efficiency we have, for
any non empty coalition T ,
ϕi(wT ) = φi(wT )=
{
1− (n− t)h(wT )
t
if i ∈ T
h(wT ) if i /∈ T
Thus ϕ and φ coincide on the basis {wT , T ⊆ S, T 6= ∅}. Hence ϕ = φ.
To prove the second part of statement 1), suppose that ψ is not regular and defined
such that there exists p < n with aψ(p) = 1, aψ(p − 1) = aψ(p + 1) = 0. Consider the
LES value φ defined such that aφ(p) = 0 and aφ(s) = aψ(s) elsewhere. Let us prove
that, if i ∈ N is a null player in Shapley sense for ψ in a game (N, v) then i is also null
in Shapley sense for φ in (N, v) :
Assume that i ∈ N is null in Shapley sense for ψ in a game (N, v). Thus aψ(s)v(S) −
aψ(s− 1)v(S\i) = 0 for all S 3 i.
for all S 3 i,
• if s < p or s ≥ p+ 2 , then
aφ(s)v(S)− aφ(s− 1)v(S\i) = aψ(s)v(S)− aψ(s− 1)v(S \ i) = 0.
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• if s = p or s = p+ 1, then aφ(s)v(S)− aφ(s− 1)v(S \ i) = 0− 0 = 0.
Finally, i is a null player in Shapley sense for φ in (N, v).
Thus, for any game (N, v) and for any null player i ∈ N in Shapley sense for ψ in the
game (N, v), ψi(N, v) = φi(N, v) = 0, while ψ 6= φ.
2) Suppose that ϕ and φ are such that ϕi(N, v) = φi(N, v) whenever i is a null player
in Solidarity sense for a LES value ψ in any (N, v) ∈ Γ(N). Let us consider that b(k)nk=1
are the constants in the representation (4) of ψ. Now for any coalition T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅,
consider the game
wT (S) =

∏s
k=t+1
(
1− 1−b(k)
k−1 t
)
if T ⊂ S, |S| = s > |T | = t
1 if T = S
0 otherwise
(5)
a) {wT , T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅} constitutes a base of Γ(N) since :
If T1, T2, ...., TK (with K = 2n − 1 and |Tk| = tk) is a sequence of all the non empty
subsets of N such that 1 = t1 ≤ t2 ≤, ...,≤ tK = n then the K ×K matrix M = [mlq]
defined by mlq = wTl(Tq) l, q = 1, 2, ..., K. is a triangle matrix with all diagonal entries
equal to 1. Thus {wT , T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅} constitutes a set of K linear independant vectors
of Γ(N), thus a basis of Γ(N).
b) We prove that, For any non empty coalition T , i is a null player in Solidarity sense
for ψ in wT if and only if i ∈ N \ T :
First, it is easy to see that, for any player i ∈ N \ T and for any coalition S 3 i, with
|S| = s > 1,
wT (S) =
(
1− 1−b(s)
s−1 t
)
wT (S \ i) and wT (S) = 0 if s = 1
Second, we prove that, for any player i ∈ N \ T and for all coalition S 3 i, BwTi (S) = 0.
For any player i ∈ N \ T , for any coalition S 3 i, with |S| = s, we have :
If s = 1,
- T * S ⇒ wT (S) = 0, and thus BwTi (S) = wT (S) = 0.
- T ⊆ S is impossible since i /∈ T.
If s > 1,
- T * S ⇒ T * S \ j for all j ∈ N , thus wT (S) = wT (S \ j) = 0.
BwTi (S) = b(s) [wT (S)− wT (S \ i)] +
(
1−b(s)
s−1
)∑
j∈S\i [wT (S)− wT (S \ j)] = 0.
- T ⊆ S
BwTi (S) = b(s) [wT (S)− wT (S \ i)] +
(
1−b(s)
s−1
)∑
j∈S\i [wT (S)− wT (S \ j)] = wT (S) −
b(s)wT (S \ i)−
(
1−b(s)
s−1
)∑
j∈S\iwT (S \ j).
since wT (S \ j) = wT (S \ i) for all j ∈ S \ T , and wT (S \ j) = 0 for all j ∈ T ,
BwTi (S) = wT (S)− b(s)wT (S \ i)−
(
1−b(s)
s−1
)
(s− 1− t)wT (S \ i).
= wT (S)− wT (S \ i) + t
(
1−b(s)
s−1
)
wT (S \ i).
=wT (S)−
(
1− 1−b(s)
s−1 t
)
wT (S \ i).
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= 0 according to the property in the first point of b).
c) We refer the reader to the point c) of 1).
Proof of lemma 4.1
1) Assume A1 holds.
Let i ∈ N , C ∈ R and (N, v) ∈ Γ(N).
If [a(s)v(s)− a(s− 1)v(S \ i)] = C for all S 3 i ⇔ [a(s)v(s)− a(s− 1)v(S \ i)] ≥ C and
[a(s)v(s)− a(s− 1)v(S \ i)] ≤ C for all S 3 i ⇔ [a(s)v(s)− a(s− 1)v(S \ i)] ≥ C and
[a(s)(−v(s))− a(s− 1)(−v(S \ i))] ≥ −C for all S 3 i.
Applying A1 leads to, φi(v) ≥ C and φi(−v) ≥ −C ⇔ φi(v) ≥ C and φi(v) ≤ C ⇔
φi(v) = C.
2) Assume A3 holds.
Let i ∈ N and (N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ(N).
If [a(s)v(s)−a(s−1)v(S\i)] = [a(s)w(s)−a(s−1)w(S\i)] for all S 3 i⇔ [a(s)v(s)−a(s−
1)v(S \ i)] ≥ [a(s)w(s)−a(s− 1)w(S \ i)] and [a(s)v(s)−a(s− 1)v(S \ i)] ≤ [a(s)w(s)−
a(s−1)w(S\i)] for all S 3 i⇔ [a(s)v(s)−a(s−1)v(S\i)] ≥ [a(s)w(s)−a(s−1)w(S\i)]
and [a(s)(−v(s)) − a(s − 1)(−v(S \ i))] ≥ [a(s)(−w(s)) − a(s − 1)(−w(S \ i))] for all
S 3 i.
Applying A3 leads to φi(v) ≥ φi(w) and φi(−v) ≥ φi(−w). Since φ is linear, φi(v) ≥
φi(w) and φi(v) ≤ φi(w) ⇔ φi(v) = φi(w).
3) If A5 holds then, for i ∈ N , C ∈ R and (N, v) ∈ Γ(N). If Bvi (S) = C for all S 3 i,
then [Bvi (S) ≥ C] and [Bvi (S) ≤ C] ⇔ [Bvi (S) ≥ C] and [B−vi (S) ≥ −C]. Applying A5
leads to φi(v) ≥ C and φi(−v) ≥ −C ⇔ φi(v) ≥ C and φi(v) ≤ C ⇔ φi(v) = C.
4) If A7 holds then, for i ∈ N ,(N, v), (N,w) ∈ Γ(N). If [Bvi (S) = Bwi (S)] for all S 3 i,
then [Bvi (S) ≥ Bwi (S)] and [Bvi (S) ≤ Bwi (S)] for all S 3 i ⇔ [Bvi (S) ≥ Bwi (S)] and
[B−vi (S) ≥ B−wi (S)] for all S 3 i . Applying A5 leads to φi(v) ≥ φi(w) and φi(v) ≤ φi(w)
⇔ φi(v) = φi(w).
5) A13⇒ A11
It obvious that A13⇒ A11 since A11 is a particular case of A13 with ϕ = Shapley value
and ψ = Egalitarian value.
A9⇒ A11
Suppose that A9 holds, consider a null player i in Shapley sense for ϕ in the game (N, v)
and let us show that, there exists a ∈ R, such that φi(v) = av(N)
n
.
• if v(N) = 0 then v(N) = w(N) where (N,w) is the zero game ( that is w(S) = 0
for all coalition S). Thus applying A9 leads to φi(v) = φi(w) = 0. Therefore
φi(v) = a
v(N)
n
for any a ∈ R.
• If v(N) 6= 0, considering that φ is efficient, there exists a ∈ R, such thatφi(v) = av(N)
n
.
Let us shows that a is independent of the game (N, v).
Consider another game (N,w) with w(N) 6= 0 and a null player i in Shapley
sense for ϕ in the game (N,w). There exists β ∈ R such that v(N) = βw(N).
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Considering that i is still a null player in Shapley sense for ϕ in the game (N, βw),
applying A9 we have, φi(v) = φi(βw) ⇒ av(N)
n
= a
βw(N)
n
= φi(βw), since φ is
linear, ⇒ av(N)
n
= a
βw(N)
n
= βφi(w) ⇒ φi(w) = aw(N)
n
.
A9⇒ A11 Obvious.
6) The same demonstration approach used in the proof of 5) directly leads to the proof
of 6).
Proof of Corollary 5.1
If ψ is any LES value with the constants a(k)n−1k=1 in its representation (2), then for any
TU-game (N, v) and for any i ∈ N ,
ψi(N, v) =
v(N)
n
+
∑n−1
k=1 a(k)
[
(n− k)!(k − 1)!
n!
∑
S3i v(S)−
(n− k − 1)!k!
n!
∑
i/∈S v(S)
]
Noting that, mik = 1(n−1k−1)
∑
S3i;|S|=k v(S), mik =
1
(n−1k )
∑
i/∈S;|S|=k v(S) and
mk =
1
(nk)
∑
|S|=k v(S), it is clear that, ψi(N, v) =
v(N)
n
+
∑n−1
k=1 a(k)
mik−mik
n
.
To achieve the proof of the corollary, we need only to show that mik−mik
n
= mik−mk
n−k for
all k = 1, 2, ..., n− 1.∑
|S|=k v(S) =
∑
S3i;|S|=k v(S) +
∑
S 63i;|S|=k v(S) ⇔
1
(nk)
∑
|S|=k v(S) =
1
(nk)
∑
S3i;|S|=k v(S) +
1
(nk)
∑
S 63i;|S|=k v(S). ⇔
mk =
k
n
mik +
n−k
n
mik. ⇔ mik−mikn = mik−mkn−k .
Proof of Proposition 5.1
1)⇔ 2). For any TU-game (N, v) and any two players i, j ∈ N . The property is obvious
for k = n. If k 6= n, then :
i, j average symmetric⇔ mik = mjk for all k = 1, 2, ..., n−1.⇔ mk− knmik = mk− knmjk
for all k = 1, 2, ..., n− 1.⇔ n−k
n
mik =
n−k
n
mjk for all k = 1, 2, ..., n− 1.⇔ mik = mjk for
all k = 1, 2, ..., n− 1.
1) ⇔ 3). For any TU-game (N, v) and any two players i, j ∈ N . Players i and j are
average symmetric in (N, v).⇔ mik = mjk for all k = 1, 2, ..., n ⇔ mik−mkn =
mjk−mk
n
for
all k = 1, 2, ..., n. ⇔ a(k)mik−mk
n
= a(k)
mjk−mk
n
for all k = 1, 2, ..., n and for all a(k) ∈
R.⇔ ∑nk=1 a(k)mik−mkn = ∑nk=1 a(k)mjk−mkn for all a(k) ∈ R ⇔ ϕi(N, v) = ϕj(N, v) for
all LES value ϕ.
Proof of Proposition 5.2
In an unanimity game (N, vT ) (with|T|=t), a direct computation leads to :
mik =
(n−tk−t)
(n−1k−1)
if k ≥ t and i ∈ T , and mik = (
n−t−1
k−t−1)
(n−1k−1)
if k > t and i /∈ T , and mik = 0
elsewhere.
mik =
(n−1−tk−t )
(n−1k )
if i /∈ T and k ≥ t, and mik = 0 elsewhere. It comes that,
if i /∈ T then, mik = mik−1 = 0 if k ≤ t and mik = mik−1 = (
n−t−1
k−t−1)
(n−1k−1)
if k > t
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if i ∈ T then, mik = 0 for all k while mik = (
n−t
k−t)
(n−1k−1)
if k ≥ t.
Thus, mik = mik−1 for all k = 1, 2, ...n if and only if i /∈ T .
Proof of Proposition 5.3
1) Suppose that i, j are two average null players in a TU-game (N, v), then mik = mik−1
and mjk = mjk−1 for all k = 1, 2, ...n Considering that, for any player i ∈ N , and for all
k = 1, 2, ..., n we have : mk = knmik +
n−k
n
mik thus,
k(mik −mjk) = (n− k)(mjk −mik) for all k = 1, 2, ...n.
Since i and j are average null player, we obtain :
k(mik −mjk) = (n− k)(mjk+1 −mik+1) for all k = 0, 1, 2, ..., n− 1 with mi0 = mj0 = 0.
Thus by induction it is clear that, for all k = 1, 2, ..., n mik = mjk.
2) Consider a TU-game (N, v) and an average null player i ∈ N , Shapi(N, v) =∑n
k=1
mik−mik
n
, with min = 0 and since i is average null mi1 = 0. Thus,
Shapi(N, v) =
1
n
(
∑n
k=1mik −
∑n
k=1mik) =
1
n
(
∑n
k=2mik −
∑n
k=2mik−1) =∑n
k=2
mik−mik−1
n
= 0
Proof of Proposition 5.4
1) Suppose that i, j are two average null players for the regular value ϕ in a TU-game
(N, v), and denote a(k)n−1k=1 the constants in the representation (1) of ϕ ; a(k) 6= 0 for all
k = 1, 2, ..., n.
Then akmik = ak−1mik−1 and akmjk = ak−1mjk−1 for all k = 1, 2, ...n. Considering that,
for any player i ∈ N , and for all k = 1, 2, ..., n we have : mk = knmik + n−kn mik thus,
kak(mik −mjk) = (n− k)ak(mjk −mik) for all k = 1, 2, ...n.
Since i and j are average null player for ϕ, we obtain :
kak(mik −mjk) = (n − k)ak+1(mjk+1 −mik+1) for all k = 0, 1, 2, ..., n − 1 with mi0 =
mj0 = 0. Thus by induction it is clear that, for all k = 1, 2, ..., n mik = mjk.
2) Consider a TU-game (N, v) and i ∈ N an average null player for ϕ in (N, v) ,
ϕi(N, v) =
∑n
k=1 ak
mik−mik
n
, with min = 0 and since i is average null for ϕ, mi1 = 0.
Thus,
ϕi(N, v) =
1
n
(
∑n
k=1 akmik −
∑n
k=1 akmik) =
1
n
(
∑n
k=2 akmik −
∑n
k=2 ak−1mik−1) =∑n
k=2
akmik−ak−1mik−1
n
= 0.
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